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President Trump Bars Uninsured Immigrants From the U.S.
By Peter Margulies  Monday, October 7, 2019, 4:58 PM
On Oct. 4, President Trump issued a proclamation that bars otherwise quali ed visa applicants from entry into the United States unless they are
likely to obtain “approved health insurance” within 30 days of entry. The insurance test relies on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), authorizing the president to
bar entry of foreign nationals “detrimental to the interests of the United States”—the same provision that Trump used for his travel ban, which the
Supreme Court upheld in Trump v. Hawaii.
But while the Supreme Court in Hawaii relied on the national security and foreign affairs rationale for the travel ban, the insurance test targets the
very different issue of immigrants’  nancial resources. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) speci cally addresses this issue in 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(4) by barring the admission of a foreign national who is “likely … to become a public charge.” If a challenge to the insurance test ensues
and the case reaches the Supreme Court, the outcome will show whether the court believes § 1182(f) is a wide-ranging grant of power to the
president to shape all immigration law to his liking, or a more cabined grant focusing on national security and foreign affairs.
Under the new insurance test, which will take effect on Nov. 3, “approved” plans include employer health insurance plans but cannot include a
government subsidy—meaning that Obamacare recipients would be unable to sponsor otherwise qualifying relatives. The insurance test bars the
entry of spouses, adult children, parents and siblings of U.S. citizens who would otherwise be eligible for visas, as well as the spouses of lawful
permanent residents (LPRs). It does not bar the admission of refugees or the minor children of U.S. citizens and LPRs. However, the exemption of
minor children highlights hardships created by the test. For example, a U.S. citizen or LPR without approved health insurance would be able to
obtain a visa for his foreign national minor children but would not be able to obtain a visa for his wife, even though she is the mother of those
children. The full impact of the insurance test will fall on families in which the primary breadwinner works for a salary at or just above the
minimum wage: People in this group often lack employer health insurance plans.
Because the primary impact of the insurance test is on low-wage workers, it belongs under the same rubric as the  nal rule on the INA’s public
charge provision, a longtime part of the INA that bars admission of persons who are likely to become dependent on government assistance. The
Department of Homeland Security just published this rule after nearly a year of mulling over comments from stakeholders solicited under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The rule, which is widely expected to be the subject of legal challenges when it becomes effective later in
October, departs from established practice by treating the receipt of noncash bene ts such as food stamps, public housing or certain health care
coverage as negative factors that of cials could cite in  nding a foreign national to be inadmissible. Yet, the  nal rule contrasts with the insurance
test imposed by the new presidential proclamation in an important respect: The  nal rule (see p. 41445) treats lack of nonsubsidized insurance or
ability to pay for “reasonably foreseeable” medical care as “one factor in the totality of the circumstances,” not as an absolute bar (emphasis
added). The insurance requirement, by contrast, imposes such an absolute bar. In other words, the proclamation’s insurance requirement—
apparently imposed without any interagency consultation—is more stark and sweeping than the conclusion just reached by Homeland Security
after the APA’s extensive notice and comment process.
The disharmony between the proclamation’s insurance test and Homeland Security’s approach to the same issue signals how the proclamation
clashes with venerable canons of statutory interpretation. The general/speci c canon presumes that speci c provisions, such as the INA’s public
charge provision, govern more general grants of authority, such as § 1182(f). As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, the general/speci c canon has particular relevance to specialized areas of law, such as immigration or bankruptcy, where
Congress “has enacted a comprehensive scheme and deliberately targeted speci c problems with speci c solutions.” In that context, Justice Scalia
and his co-author, Bryan Garner, explained in their classic text, “Reading Law” (p. 183), “the speci c provision comes closer to addressing the very
problem” that Congress sought to address.
A visa applicant’s likelihood of becoming a public charge—a person dependent on government assistance—is one such speci c issue. Recognizing
the importance of that issue, the administration followed the APA in developing the public charge rule, soliciting comments from stakeholders. In
keeping with the APA’s deliberative framework, responding to stakeholders’ comments took almost a year. That time for deliberation is a feature of
the APA, not a bug. However, the administration did not subject the insurance test to the APA’s notice and comment process. Instead, the president
bypassed the APA by issuing a proclamation under § 1182(f), which allows the president to suspend the entry of immigrants “detrimental to the
interests of the United States.” In invoking § 1182(f), the president need not follow the APA’s notice and comment process. However, a clash
between a president’s action under § 1182(f) and a duly promulgated rule under a more speci c statutory provision may show that the president’s
action has exceeded power delegated by Congress.
Trump’s resort to § 1182(f) tees up the issue of that provision’s scope. In Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the court, cited
the relationship of both the travel ban and earlier uses of § 1182(f) with U.S. national security and foreign affairs. According to the Supreme Court,
the travel ban  owed from an interagency process that recommended the ban as a response to dif culties in vetting of immigrants from certain
countries, including countries that were state sponsors of terrorism. Chief Justice Roberts cited the travel ban’s putative goals: to “protect national
security and public safety, and induce improvement” in vetting by affected foreign nationals’ home countries. Prior uses of § 1182(f) discussed by
the chief justice, such as President Carter’s restrictions on Iranian nationals in the United States during the Iranian hostage crisis or President
Reagan’s measures to restrict Cuban immigration to induce changes in the Castro regime’s policies, had a similar national security/foreign affairs
signature, enabling the United States to “retaliate for conduct by … [foreign] governments that con icted with U.S. foreign policy interests.”
In contrast, the new insurance test does not even assert a national security or foreign policy rationale. Instead, it rests entirely on a concern for
minimizing health care costs. That concern is legitimate as a policy matter, but the administration should have addressed it as Homeland Security
did in dealing with the INA’s public charge provision. While an interagency process led to the administration’s new public charge rule, the
insurance test did not emerge from that interagency process and indeed would short-circuit many of the new public charge rule’s criteria. In effect,
the insurance test reduces those elaborate criteria to a single question: Does the immigrant have health insurance?
Allowing the administration to issue a proclamation to undermine its own  nal rule would make a mockery of both the APA and Congress’s
carefully constructed immigration framework. Upholding the insurance test would set the stage for unbridled executive efforts to overhaul the
INA’s framework in areas far removed from national security and foreign relations. Under the general/speci c canon, courts should reject the
inference that Congress intended a general provision like § 1182(f) to decimate more speci c statutory measures.
As Justice Scalia’s opinion in RadLAX suggests, the Supreme Court’s usual approach to statutory interpretation would invalidate the insurance
test. But one can read Hawaii as heralding a greater ambit of deference under § 1182(f). If a challenge to the insurance test reaches the Supreme
Court, the outcome will say a great deal about how the usual canons interact with executive power over immigration outside the national security
and foreign affairs domain.
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